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Abstract
We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election
involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures.
The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus Coherent
IIA single out a voting procedure studied in our recent work: Split Cycle. In particular, Split Cycle is the
most resolute voting procedure satisfying the six axioms for democratic defeat. In addition, we analyze
how Split Cycle escapes Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and related impossibility results.
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1 Introduction
In the abstract for his lecture at a 2017 Lindau Nobel Laureate Meeting, Eric Maskin (2017) claimed that
“The systems that most countries use to elect presidents are deeply flawed,” a claim defended in writing by
Maskin and Sen (2016; 2017a; 2017b). In fact, the issue goes far beyond presidential elections: the same
voting systems are used in elections ranging from national elections to elections in small committees and
clubs. In our view, the key issue highlighted by Maskin and Sen can be stated in terms of the following
normative principle (closely related to what voting theorists call Condorcet consistency, defined below1).
Majority Defeat: if a candidate does not win in an election, they must have been defeated by some
other candidate in the election, and a candidate should defeat another only if a majority of voters
prefer the first candidate to the second.
As is well known, widely used voting systems can violate the principle of Majority Defeat.
Example 1.1. In the 2000 U.S. presidential election in Florida, George W. Bush defeated Al Gore and
Ralph Nader according to Plurality voting, which only allows voters to vote for one candidate. Yet based
on the plausible inference that most Nader voters preferred Gore to Bush (see Magee 2003), it follows that
a majority of all voters preferred Gore to Bush.
Example 1.2. In the 2009 mayoral election in Burlington, Vermont, the Progressive candidate Bob Kiss
defeated the Democratic candidate Andy Montroll according to Ranked Choice voting (defined in Example
2.11 below), but Montroll was preferred to each of the other candidates including Kiss by majorities of voters,
according to the ranked ballots collected.
Example 1.3. During the 2016 U.S. presidential primary season, an NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll
(March 3-6) asked respondents both for their top choice and their preference between Donald Trump and each
of Ted Cruz, John Kasich, and Marco Rubio. Trump was the Plurality winner, receiving 30% of first place
votes, but Cruz, Kasich, and Rubio were each preferred to Trump by 57%, 57%, and 56% of respondents,
respectively (see Kurrild-Klitgaard 2018 concerning statistical significance). For further discussion of whether
another Republican might have been majority preferred to Trump, see Maskin and Sen 2016, Maskin 2017,
Kurrild-Klitgaard 2018, and Woon et al. 2020.
For related examples outside the U.S., see, e.g., Kaminski 2015, § 20.3.2 and Feizi et al. 2020.
The above failures of Majority Defeat involve spoiler effects. In Example 1.1, although it is likely that
a majority of voters preferred Gore to Bush and also preferred Gore to Nader, Nader’s inclusion in the
race spoiled the election for Gore, handing victory to Bush. In Example 1.2, although a majority of voters
preferred Montroll to Kiss and a majority preferred Montroll to the Republican candidate, Kurt Wright,
1For the relation between Majority Defeat and Condorcet consistency, see Remark 4.14.
2
Wright’s inclusion in the race spoiled the election for Montroll, handing victory to Kiss. Finally, in Example
1.3, although the NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll did not ask for respondents’ preferences between Cruz,
Kasich, and Rubio, if one of them was majority preferred to the other two, then it would be reasonable to
call the latter two spoilers for the first, as their inclusion in the poll handed the plurality victory to Trump.
What other benefits might respecting Majority Defeat provide besides mitigating spoiler effects of the
kind shown above? Maskin and Sen (2017a) make the following conjecture:
[M]ajority rule may reduce polarization. A centrist like Bloomberg [in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election] may not be ranked first by a large proportion of voters [and hence cannot win under
Plurality], but can still be elected [with the backing of majorities against each other candidate] if
viewed as a good compromise. Majority rule also encourages public debate about a larger group of
potential candidates [since more candidates can participate without worry of their being spoilers],
bringing us closer to John Stuart Mill’s ideal of democracy as “government by discussion.”
To respect the principle of Majority Defeat, we need to collect ballots in which voters rank the candidates
in the election.2 Due to the possibility of strategic voting, we cannot guarantee that voters’ rankings of
the candidates always reflect their sincere preferences (see Taylor 2005), but one can try to choose voting
procedures that provide fewer incentives for strategic voting (see, e.g., Chamberlin 1985, Nitzan 1985, Bassi
2015, Holliday and Pacuit 2019). Assuming we collect ranked ballots, a wide variety of voting procedures
become available (see, e.g., Brams and Fishburn 2002, Pacuit 2019, and Examples 2.11 and 2.16 below).
One obvious idea for satisfying the principle of Majority Defeat is to say that one candidate defeats
another if and only if a majority of voters prefer the first candidate to the second. Notoriously, however,
this can result in every candidate being defeated, leaving no candidate who wins. In particular, there can
be a majority cycle, wherein a majority of voters prefer a to b, a majority of voters prefer b to c, and
a majority of voters prefer c to a (Condorcet 1785). Majority cycles may also involve more than three
candidates. This so-called Paradox of Voting is perhaps the main theoretical obstacle to the possibility of
rational democratic decision making with more than two candidates. Riker (1982) has famously argued
that the Paradox of Voting, along with the related Arrow Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 1963), destroys
the notion of a coherent “will of the people” in a democracy.3 Although there is not yet enough empirical
research to know how prevalent majority cycles are in real elections of various scales,4 majority cycles have
been found in some large elections (see Deemen 2014). In a typical election, we expect (or at least hope) that
there will be a Condorcet winner—a candidate a such that for every candidate b, a majority of voters prefer
a to b—in which case some voting theorists believe that the choice is clear: elect the Condorcet winner (see,
e.g., Felsenthal and Machover 1992; Maskin and Sen 2017a,b). A voting method is Condorcet consistent if
it chooses as the unique winner of an election the Condorcet winner, whenever a Condorcet winner exists.
2One could collect even more information from each voter than a rankings of the candidates: e.g., a ranking plus a distin-
guished set of “approved” candidates (cf. Brams and Sanver 2009) or a grading of each candidate (cf. Balinski and Laraki 2010)
from which a ranking can be derived. In this paper, we assume that only rankings of the candidates are collected from voters.
3Wolf (1970) takes these results to show that “majority rule is fatally flawed by an internal inconsistency” (p. 59), and Hardin
(1990) takes them to cast “doubt on the conceptual coherence of majoritarian democracy” (p. 184). For further discussion, see
Risse 2001, 2009.
4As Van Deemen (2014) remarks, “it is remarkable to see that the empirical research on the paradox has been conducted
mainly for large elections. Collective decision making processes in relatively small committees, such as corporate boards of
directors, management teams in organizations, government cabinets, councils of political parties and so on, have hardly been
studied” (p. 325). Concerning the relevance of such empirical research, Ingham (2019) argues that “Arrow’s theorem and related
results threaten the populist’s principle of democratic legitimacy even if majority preference cycles never occur” (p. 97).
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But there must be some backup plan in place in case there is no Condorcet winner.
In the absence of a Condorcet winner, Maskin and Sen (2017a) suggest “having a runoff between the two
top candidates,” but defining “the two top candidates” faces some of the same difficulties as defining “the
best candidate.” In a recent paper (Holliday and Pacuit 2020a), we study a voting procedure that we call
Split Cycle, which provides a different backup plan for the case where no Condorcet winner exists. Instead
of saying if there is a Condorcet winner, elect that person, and if not, do something else with a different
justification, Split Cycle provides a unified rule for cases with or without Condorcet winners:
In an election with candidates x and y, say that x wins by n over y when there are n more voters who
prefer x to y than who prefer y to x. Then x defeats y according to Split Cycle if x wins by more than
n over y for the smallest number n such that there is no majority cycle, containing x and y, in which
each candidate wins by more than n over the next candidate in the cycle.
As we show, Split Cycle mitigates spoiler effects (see Section 4.3) and has several other virtues, including
avoiding the so-called Strong No Show Paradox (see Holliday and Pacuit 2020a).
In this paper, we arrive at Split Cycle (defined formally in Section 3) by another route. We propose
six general axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving
two or more candidates (Section 4). Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by proposed voting procedures.
The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow’s famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) (Arrow 1963). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus
Coherent IIA single out Split Cycle (Section 5). In particular, our main result is that Split Cycle is the most
resolute voting procedure satisfying the six axioms for democratic defeat.
In the second half of the paper, we analyze how Split Cycle manages to escapes Arrow’s Impossibility
Theorem and related impossibility results in social choice theory (Section 6). The answer is twofold: we
weaken IIA to Coherent IIA, and we relax Arrow’s assumptions about the properties of the defeat relation
between candidates. We explain how neither of these moves is sufficient by itself to escape Arrow-like
impossibility theorems. But by doing both, Split Cycle provides a compelling response, we think, to both
the Paradox of Voting and Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem.
A key aspect of our characterization of Split Cycle using the six axioms for defeat is that we work with
a model in which elections can have different sets of voters and different sets of candidates, just as they do
in reality. Given the importance of this variable-election setting to our characterization, we consider how
standard impossibility results for a fixed set of candidates/voters can be adapted to and even strengthened
in the variable-election setting, and yet how Split Cycle still escapes them (Sections 6.2 and 6.3). One of the
methodological lessons of the paper, in our view, is the value of working in a variable-election framework.
We start in Section 2 by reviewing the formal framework we will use to conduct our analysis.
2 Voting methods and collective choice rules
As suggested in Section 1, we work in a variable voter and variable candidate setting. This means that our
group decision method can input elections (formalized as profiles below) with different sets of voters and
different sets of candidates.5 To allow sets of voters and candidates of arbitrary (but finite) size in elections,
5By contrast, in voting theory and social choice theory, one often studies group decision methods all of whose inputs have
the same set of voters and same set of candidates. See Section 6.1.
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we first fix infinite sets V and X of voters and candidates, respectively. A given election will use only finite
subsets V ⊆ V and X ⊆ X . We consider elections in which each voter in the election submits a ranking of
all the candidates in the election, which we assume (for simplicity) is a strict linear order on the set X of
candidates, i.e., a binary relation P on X satisfying the following conditions for all x, y, z ∈ X :
• asymmetry: if xPy then not yPx;
• transitivity: if xPy and yPz, then xPz;
• connectedness: if x 6= y, then xPy or yPx.
We take xPy to mean that the voter strictly prefers candidate x to candidate y. For a set X , let L(X) be
the set of all strict linear orders on X . Then we formalize the notion of an election as follows.
Definition 2.1. A profile is a function P : V → L(X) for some nonempty finite V ⊆ V and nonempty finite
X ⊆ X , which we denote by V (P) (called the set of voters in P) and X(P) (called the set of candidates in
P), respectively. We call P(i) voter i’s ballot, and we write ‘xPiy’ for (x, y) ∈ P(i).
When we display profiles, we show their “anonymized form” that records only the number of candidates
with each type of ballot, rather than the identities of the voters. For example:
4 2 3
a b c
b c a
c a b
The above diagram indicates that two voters rank b above c above a (notation: bca), etc.
It will be important later to consider the restriction of a profile to a subset of the candidates.
Definition 2.2. Given a binary relation P on X and Y ⊆ X , let P|Y be the restriction of P to the set Y ,
i.e., P|Y = P ∩ (Y × Y ). Given a profile P, let P|Y be the profile with X(P|Y ) = Y and V (P|Y ) = V (P)
obtained from P by restricting each voter’s ballot to the set Y .6
We now consider two different kinds of group decision methods, differing in what they output. The first
kind outputs a set of winners for the election.
Definition 2.3. A voting method is a function F on the domain of all profiles such that for any profile P,
∅ 6= F (P) ⊆ X(P). We call F (P) the set of winners for P under F .
As usual, if F (P) contains multiple candidates, we assume that some further tie-breaking process would then
apply, though we do not fix the nature of this process (see Schwartz 1986, pp. 14-5 for further discussion).
If x 6∈ F (P), this means that x is excluded from the rest of the process that leads to the ultimate winner.
The second kind of group decision method outputs an asymmetric binary relation on the set of candidates.
In social choice theory, this relation is typically called the “strict social preference” relation. We interpret
this binary relation as a defeat relation for the election in the sense of Section 1.
6I.e., for all i ∈ V (P), P|Y (i) = P(i)|Y .
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Definition 2.4. A variable-election collective choice rule (VCCR) is a function f on the domain of all
profiles such that for any profile P, f(P) is an asymmetric binary relation on X(P), which we call the defeat
relation for P under f . For x, y ∈ X(P), we say that x defeats y in P according to f when (x, y) ∈ f(P).
A well-known special case of a collective choice rule is what Arrow called a social welfare function (SWF).
The output of an SWF is a strict weak order, i.e., a binary relation P on X satisfying asymmetry and the
condition that for all x, y, z ∈ X :
• if xPy, then xPz or zPy.
Note that these conditions imply that P is transitive. In the variable-election setting, we define the following.
Definition 2.5. A variable-election social welfare function (VSWF) is a VCCR f such that for any profile
P, f(P) is a strict weak order.
For readers familiar with the standard setup in social choice theory, we note some subtleties about our
definitions.
Remark 2.6.
1. We add the modifier ‘variable-election’ because the term ‘collective choice rule’ due to Sen (2017,
Ch. 2∗) appears in a fixed voter and fixed candidate setting.
2. In social choice theory, one often defines the output of a CCR (as Sen does) to be a “weak social
preference” relation R that is reflexive instead of asymmetric. For social welfare functions, the choice
does not matter, because strict weak orders P are in one-to-one correspondence with complete and
transitive relations R.7 However, since we aim to study the concept of defeat, an asymmetric relation,
we have defined VCCRs accordingly.
3. For simplicity, we build the axiom of Universal Domain into the definition of a VCCR, but one could of
course define a notion of VCCR where only certain profiles are in the domain of f (cf. Gaertner 2001).
Any VSWF f induces a voting method f such that for any profile P, f(P) is the set of candidates who
are not defeated by any candidates in P according to f . That f(P) is a strict weak order implies that f(P)
is nonempty, but in fact a much weaker condition is sufficient—namely, acyclicity.
Definition 2.7. Let P be an asymmetric binary relation on a set X . A cycle in P is a sequence x1, . . . , xn
of elements of X such that x1Px2, . . . , xn−1Pxn, xn = x1, and all elements are distinct except x1 and xn.
8
The relation P is acyclic if there is no cycle in P . A VCCR f is acyclic if for all profiles P, f(P) is acyclic.
Any acyclic VCCR induces a voting method that outputs for a given profile the set of undefeated candi-
dates. All defeated candidates are excluded from the rest of the process that leads to the ultimate winner.
Lemma 2.8. Given any acyclic VCCR f , the function f on the set of profiles defined by
f(P) = {x ∈ X(P) | there is no y ∈ X(P) : y defeats x in P according to f}
is a voting method, as ∅ 6= f(P) ⊆ X(P).
7A relation R on X is complete if for all x, y ∈ X, we have xRy or yRx.
8Thus, we are use the term ‘cycle’ for what is usually called a simple cycle.
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Given a voting method F , we can consider the acyclic VCCRs from which F arises as in Lemma 2.8.
Definition 2.9. Let F be a voting method and f a VCCR. Then F is defeat rationalized by f if F = f .
Let us now review some standard VCCRs. Several of the VCCRs are based on the majority preference
relation, defined as follows.
Definition 2.10. Given a profile P and x, y ∈ X(P), we say that x is majority preferred to y in P (and y
is majority dispreferred to x in P) if more voters rank x above y in P than rank y above x in P. We write
x→P y (or x→ y if P is clear from context) to indicate that x is majority preferred to y in P.
A majority cycle in P is a cycle in the relation →P.
Example 2.11.
1. Simple Majority. For x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y in P if and only if x→ y.
2. Covering (Gillies 1959; Fishburn 1977; Miller 1980). For x, y ∈ X(P), say that x left-covers y in P
if for all z ∈ X(P), if z → x, then z → y; and x right-covers y in P if for all z ∈ X(P), if y → z,
then x→ z. (Left-covering and right-covering are equivalent if P has an odd number of voters but not
for an even number of voters.) We say that x defeats y in P according to the Left Covering VCCR
(resp. Right Covering VCCR) if x→ y and x left-covers y (resp. x→ y and x right-covers y). We say
that x defeats y in P according to the Fishburn VCCR if x left-covers y but y does not left-cover x.
3. Copeland (Copeland 1951). The Copeland score of a candidate x in profile P is the number of
candidates to whom x is majority preferred in P minus the number of candidates who are majority
preferred to x in P: |{z ∈ X(P) | x→ z}| − |{z ∈ X(P) | z → x}|. Then for x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y
in P if and only if the Copeland score of x is greater than the Copeland score of y.
4. Borda. The Borda score of a candidate x in profile P is calculated as follows: for every voter who
ranks x in last place, x receives 0 points, and for every voter who ranks x in second to last place, x
receives 1 point, and so on. That is, for every voter who ranks x in k places above last place, x receives
k points. The sum of the points that x receives is x’s Borda score in P. Then for x, y ∈ X(P), x
defeats y in P if and only if the Borda score of x is greater than the Borda score of y.
5. Plurality. The plurality score of a candidate x in profile P is the number of voters who rank x in first
place. Then for x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y in P if and only if the plurality score of x is greater than the
plurality score of y.
6. Ranked Choice (Hare). Given a profile P, define a sequence P0, . . . ,Pn of profiles as follows. First,
P0 = P. Second, given a profile Pk in the sequence, if all candidates in Pk have the same plurality
score, set n = k to end the sequence; otherwise, where Ak is the set of candidates whose plurality
score in Pk is above the lowest plurality score of a candidate in Pk, let Pk+1 be obtained from Pk by
restricting the set of candidates to Ak, i.e., Pk+1 = (Pk)|Ak .
9 The Hare score of candidate x in P is
the number of rounds of elimination that x survives, i.e., the greatest k such that x ∈ Ak. Then x
defeats y in P if and only if the Hare score of x is greater than the Hare score of y.
9When there is more than one candidate with lowest plurality score, this definition of Ranked Choice eliminates all such
candidates. For discussion of another way of dealing with ties for the lowest plurality score, see Freeman et al. 2015, § 3.
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VCCRs 2-6 are all acyclic—but 1 is not, due to the possibility of majority cycles—and 3-6 are VSWFs. For ax-
iomatic characterizations of the Copeland and Borda VSWFs, see Rubinstein 1980 and Nitzan and Rubinstein
1981; Mihara 2017, respectively.
VCCRs 1-4 all have an important property in common: their output depends only on the margins between
candidates in the given profile.
Definition 2.12. Let P be a profile and x, y ∈ X(P). The margin of x over y in P is the number of voters
who rank x above y in P minus the number of voters who rank y above x in P.10 Let MarginP(x, y) be the
margin of x over y in P.
The margin graph of P, M(P), is the directed graph with weighted edges whose set of nodes is X(P)
with an edge from x to y when x is majority preferred to y, weighted by the margin of x over y in P.
Example 2.13. For a profile P shown in anonymized form on the left, its margin graph M(P) is shown on
the right:
4 2 3
a b c
b c a
c a b a c
b
3
1
5
Now the idea that the output of a VCCR depends only on margins can be formalized as follows.11
Definition 2.14. A VCCR f is margin based if for any profiles P and P′, if M(P) = M(P′), then
f(P) = f(P′).
It is obvious that VCCRs 1-3 in Example 2.11 are margin based, but this is less obvious for Borda.
Lemma 2.15. For any profile P and x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y according to the Borda VCCR if and only if
the sum of the margins of x over other all other candidates is greater than the sum of the margins of y over
all other candidates.12
Other examples of margin based VCCR include the following.
Example 2.16.
1. Weighted Covering (Dutta and Laslier 1999). Given a profile P and x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y in P
if x→ y and for all z ∈ X(P), MarginP(x, z) ≥MarginP(y, z).
2. Beat Path (Schulze 2011). Given a profile P and x, y ∈ X(P) a path from x to y is a sequence
z1, . . . , zn of candidates with z1 = x and zn = y such that each candidate is majority preferred to the
next candidate in the sequence. The strength of a path is the smallest margin between consecutive
candidates in the path. Then x defeats y in P according to the Beat Path VCCR if the strength of
the strongest path from x to y is greater than the strength of the strongest path from y to x.
10Note that the margin of x over y is negative when y is majority preferred to x.
11Cf. De Donder et al.’s (2000) notion of C1.5 functions. Note that Fishburn’s (1977) C2 functions can use not only the
difference between the number of voters who prefer x to y and the number of voters who prefer y to x, but also those two
numbers themselves. The Pareto VCCR in Example 4.6 is C2 but not margin based (not C1.5).
12Remember that the margin of x over z is negative when z is majority preferred to x.
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Remark 2.17. Within the family of margin based VCCRs, we can make a useful three-way distinction.
1. A majority graph is any directed graph M whose edge relation is asymmetric. Given a profile P, the
majority graph of P, M(P), is the directed graph whose set of nodes is X(P) with an edge from x to
y when x is majority preferred to y in P. We say that a VCCR f is majority based if for any profiles
P and P′, if M(P) = M(P′), then f(P) = f(P′).13 The Simple Majority, Covering, and Copeland
VCCRs in Example 2.11 are majority based in this sense.
2. A qualitative margin graph is a pair M = (M,≺) where M is a majority graph and ≺ is a strict weak
order on the set of edges ofM . The qualitative margin graph of P is the pair M(P) = (M(P),≺P) such
that for any edges (a, b) and (c, d) inM(P), we have (a, b) ≺P (c, d) ifMarginP(a, b) < MarginP(c, d).
We say that a VCCR f is qualitative-margin based if for any profiles P and P′, if M(P) = M(P′),
then f(P) = f(P′).14 The Weighted Covering and Beat Path VCCRs in Example 2.16 are qualitative-
margin based in this sense, as is the Split Cycle VCCR defined in Section 3, but none of these VCCRs
are majority based.
3. We already defined margin based VCCRs in Definition 2.14. Note that the Borda VCCR in Example
2.11 is margin based but not qualitative-margin based.
This concludes our review of basic notions. In the next section we turn to our preferred voting method
and VCCR.
3 Split Cycle
In Holliday and Pacuit 2020a, we studied a voting method that we call Split Cycle. Here we formulate Split
Cycle as a VCCR, which defeat rationalizes the Split Cycle voting method (recall Definition 2.9). We give
two formulations in Definition 3.1 and Lemma 3.5, respectively. The first definition of Split Cycle formalizes
the definition given in Section 1. For a profile P, candidates x, y ∈ X(P), and natural number n, say that
x wins by n over y if the margin of x over y in P is n (recall Definition 2.12).
Definition 3.1. Given a profile P and candidates x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y in P according to Split Cycle if
x wins by more than n over y for the smallest number n such that there is no majority cycle, containing x
and y, in which each candidate wins by more than n over the next candidate in the cycle.
The basic idea is that when the electorate’s majority preference relation is incoherent, in the sense that
there is a majority cycle, this raises the threshold required for one candidate a in the cycle to defeat another
b—but not infinitely. If we raise the threshold n sufficiently, then there will be no incoherence involving a
and b with respect to the higher threshold, i.e., no cycles in the win by more than n relation that contain a
and b. If the margin of a over b is greater than this sufficiently large n, Split Cycle says that a defeats b.
Example 3.2. Consider a profile P with the following margin graph:
13Cf. Fishburn’s (1977) C1 functions.
14In terms of the C1, C1.5, and C2 classifications in Footnotes 11 and 13, qualitative-margin based methods could be
called C1.25. Another example of a qualitative-margin based VCCR defeat rationalizes the Simpson-Kramer Minimax method
(Simpson 1969, Kramer 1977): x defeats y if x’s largest majority loss is smaller than y’s largest majority loss.
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a c
b
d
5 7
3
3
3
3
The only majority cycle is a, b, c, a. Note that each candidate wins by more than 2 over the next candidate
in the sequence. However, it is not the case that each candidate wins by more than 3 over the next candidate
in the sequence. Thus, a threshold of win by more than 3 splits the a, b, c, a cycle:
a c
b
5 7
Hence there is no incoherence involving a and b with respect to the win by more than 3 relation. Then since
a wins by more than 3 over b, Split Cycle says that a defeats b. Similarly, since b wins by more than 3 over
c, Split Cycle says that b defeats c. However, since c does not win by more than 3 over a, Split Cycle says
that c does not defeat a. Crucially, though, since c and d are not involved in any cycles together, and c wins
by more than 0 over d, Split Cycle says that c defeats d. The key point is that incoherence can be localized :
c and a belong to a cycle together, but c and d do not. By the same reasoning, a defeats d, and b defeats d.
Thus, we obtain the following defeat relation:
a c
b
d
D D
D
D
D
Note that just as in a sporting tournament, it can happen that while team a defeats team b and team b
defeats team c, team a does not defeat team c, the same phenomenon occurs in the defeat relation above.
Finally, since a is the only undefeated candidate, a is the winner according to Split Cycle.
Additional examples of determining the Split Cycle defeat relation will be given below (Example 4.8,
Remark 4.10, and Example 4.12). For still more examples, see Holliday and Pacuit 2020a.
Remark 3.3. Where f is the Split Cycle VCCR as in Definition 3.1, the induced voting method f , which
picks as winners the undefeated candidates, is the Split Cycle voting method. As a voting method, Split
Cycle is Condorcet consistent: if x is majority preferred to every other candidate y—if x is a Condorcet
winner—then x is the unique winner of the election. For if x is the Condorcet winner, then there are no
cycles involving x, so x defeats all other candidates according to Split Cycle.
An equivalent definition of Split Cycle can be given in terms of the following concept.
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Definition 3.4. Let P be a profile and ρ a majority cycle in P. The splitting number of ρ in P is the
smallest margin between consecutive candidates in ρ. Let Split#P(ρ) be the splitting number of ρ in P.
For example, the splitting number of the cycle a, b, c, a in the profile in Example 3.2 is 3. In Holliday and Pacuit
2020a, we took the following formulation of Split Cycle to be the official definition (for a proof of Lemma
3.5, see Appendix A).
Lemma 3.5. Let P be a profile and x, y ∈ X(P). Then x defeats y in P according to Split Cycle if and
only if MarginP(x, y) > 0 and
MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every majority cycle ρ in P containing x and y.
Thus, in Example 3.2, a defeats b because MarginP(a, b) = 5, the only majority cycle is a, b, c, a, and its
splitting number is 3. Note that since we are only comparing the sizes of margins, Split Cycle is qualitative-
margin based in the sense of Remark 2.17.
A useful fact, proved in Holliday and Pacuit 2020a, is that it suffices to only look at majority cycles in
which y directly follows x.15 We include the proof in Appendix A to keep the paper self-contained.
Lemma 3.6. Let P be a profile and x, y ∈ X(P). Then x defeats y in P according to Split Cycle if and
only if MarginP(x, y) > 0 and
MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every majority cycle ρ in P of the form x→ y → z1 → · · · → zn → x.
In Holliday and Pacuit 2020a, we show that Split Cycle—understood as a voting method, i.e., as f for
the Split Cycle VCCR f—satisfies a number of desirable axioms for voting methods, and we systematically
compare Split Cycle to other margin based voting methods, including Beat Path and Ranked Pairs (Tideman
1987). In particular, we show that Split Cycle is the only known voting method that simultaneously satisfies
a Pareto axiom, an anti-spoiler axiom, and an axiom preventing the so-called Strong No Show Paradox. In
the next two sections, we take a different approach: we characterize Split Cycle as a VCCR, rather than a
voting method, and we characterize the Split Cycle VCCR relative to all VCCRs.
4 Axioms
In this section, we propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic
election involving two or more candidates. Four axiom are standard (Section 4.1); one is less well known but
also from the previous literature (Section 4.2); and the key axiom is new (Section 4.3).
4.1 Standard axioms
The first four axioms are ubiquitous in social choice and voting theory. The first axiom appears already in
May’s (1952) characterization of majority rule for two-candidate elections:
15This fact relates Split Cycle to concepts in Heitzig 2002, as discussed in Holliday and Pacuit 2020a.
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A1. Anonymity and Neutrality: if x defeats y in P, and P′ is obtained from P by swapping the ballots
assigned to two voters, then x still defeats y in P′ (Anonymity); and if x defeats y in P, and P′ is
obtained from P by swapping x and y on each voter’s ballot, then y defeats x in P′ (Neutrality).16
It is clear that all VCCRs defined so far in this paper satisfy Anonymity and Neutrality.
The second axiom is definitive of the problem of choosing winners that we aim to solve:
A2. Availability: for every P, there is some undefeated candidate in P.
To say that in some profiles all candidates are defeated and hence excluded from further consideration—so
no candidate is available to become the ultimate winner—is to give up on solving the problem. Unlike the
Simple Majority VCCR (Example 2.11), Split Cycle satisfies Availability.
Proposition 4.1. Split Cycle satisfies Availability.
Proof. Suppose there is a profile P in which every candidate is defeated by some other. Since X(P) is finite,
it follows that there is a sequence ρ = x1, . . . , xn of candidates with x1 = xn such that each candidate defeats
the next candidate in the sequence. It follows by Lemma 3.5 that ρ is a majority cycle in which the margin
of each candidate over the next is greater than the splitting number of ρ, which is impossible.
Note that Availability is strictly weaker than the assumption that a VCCR is acyclic. There being no defeat
cycles implies that some candidate is undefeated (given that the set of candidates in a profile is finite), but
some candidate being undefeated does not imply that there are no defeat cycles (e.g., a could be undefeated
while there is a defeat cycle involving b, c, and d). Nonetheless, the proof of Proposition 4.1 (starting in the
second sentence) shows that Split Cycle is an acyclic VCCR as well.
For the third axiom, given any profile P and natural number m, the profile mP is obtained from P by
replacing each voter by m copies of that voter. For example, if P has three voters i, j, k, then 2P has six
voters i1, i2, j1, j2, k1, k2 such that the ballots of i1 and i2 in 2P are the same as those of i in P, etc.
A3. (Upward) Homogeneity: for every P, if x defeat y in P, then x defeats y in 2P.
Homogeneity is usually stated as the condition that for any m ≥ 1, x defeats y in P if and only if x defeats
y in mP. As Smith (1973, p. 1029) remarks, “Homogeneity seems an extremely natural requirement; if each
voter suddenly splits into m voters, each of whom has the same preferences as the original, it would be hard
to imagine how the “collective preference” would change.” Nonetheless, we use the weaker version stated
above since it is sufficient for our main result. Almost all standard voting procedures satisfy (the usual
statement of) Homogeneity.17 That Split Cycle satisfies Homogeneity follows from the fact that Split Cycle
is qualitative-margin based as in Remark 2.17, and P and 2P have the same qualitative margin graphs.
The fourth axiom is another one of the most basic principles of voting theory. The term ‘Monotonicity’
is used for a number of different conditions, but our formulation is equivalent (for profiles of linear ballots)
to Arrow’s (1963) axiom of Positive Association of Social and Individual Values:18
16These versions of Anonymity and Neutrality stated in terms of the transposition of two ballots/candidates are equivalent
to the usual versions stated in terms of a permutation of the ballots/candidates, since any permutation can be obtained by a
sequence of transpositions. The usual version of, e.g., Neutrality states that if σ is a permutation of X, and σP is the profile
obtained from P by setting xσPiy if and only if σ(x)Piσ(y), then x defeats y in σP if and only if σ(x) defeats σ(y) in P.
17One exception is the Dodgson voting procedure (see Fishburn 1977, Brandt 2009).
18Positive Association states that if x defeats y in P according to f , and P′ is a profile such that for all x′, y′ ∈ X \ {x},
(i) P|{x′,y′} = P
′
|{x′,y′}
, (ii) for all i ∈ V , xPiy′ implies xP′iy
′, and (iii) for all i ∈ V , y′P′ix implies y
′Pix, then x defeats y in
P′ according to f .
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A4. Monotonicity (resp. Monotonicity for two-candidate profiles): if x defeats y in a profile (resp. two-
candidate profile) P, and P′ is obtained from P by some voter i moving x above the candidate that i
ranked immediately above x in P, then x defeats y in P′.
We think Monotonicity should hold for profiles with any number of candidates, but Monotonicity for two-
candidate profiles is sufficient for the proof of our main result. This is noteworthy because the Ranked Choice
VCCR in Example 2.11 does not satisfy Monotonicity for arbitrary profiles (see, e.g., Felsenthal 2012) but
does for two-candidate profiles. All other VCCRs defined above satisfy Monotonicity for arbitrary profiles.
The axioms proposed so far imply the principle of Majority Defeat for two-candidates profiles. The proof
is essentially part of the proof of May’s (1952) characterization of majority rule.
Lemma 4.2. If f satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality, and Monotonicity with respect to two-candidate profiles,
then f satisfies Special Majority Defeat: for any two-candidate profile P, x defeats y in P according to f
only if x is majority preferred to y.
Proof. Suppose x defeats y in P. It follows by Anonymity, Neutrality, and the asymmetry of defeat that the
number of voters who rank x above y is not equal to the number who rank y above x. Now we claim that x
is majority preferred to y. Suppose instead that y is majority preferred to x by a margin of m. Flip voters
with yPix to xP
′
iy until we obtain a profile P
′ in which x is majority preferred to y by a margin of m. Since
x defeats y in P, x still defeats y in P′ by Monotonicity. But P′ can also be obtained from P by the voter
and candidate swaps described in the statements of Anonymity and Neutrality. Thus, since x defeats y in
P, y defeats x in P′. Hence in P′, x defeats y and y defeats x, contradicting the asymmetry of defeat.
Remark 4.3. Monotonicity is weaker than May’s (1952) condition of Positive Responsiveness, which in
addition requires that if y does not defeat x in P, then changing a single voter from yPix to xP
′
iy results in
x defeating y in P′. We find imposing Positive Responsiveness in general, i.e., for elections with any number
of candidates, much too strong,19 so we prefer to motivate majority rule in two-candidate elections using
axioms that we find plausible for any number of candidates, as in Proposition 4.7 below.
4.2 Neutral Reversal
Like the axiom of Homogeneity, the next axiom is a variable voter axiom. Say that two voters i and j have
reversed ballots in a profile Q if for all x, y ∈ X(Q), we have xQiy if and only if yQjx. For example, if i
has abcd and j has dcba, then i and j have reversed ballots. Adding a pair of voters with reversed ballots
to a profile does not change the margins between any candidates. A natural thought is that such voters
balance each other out, so adding such a pair to an election should not change the defeat relations between
candidates. This leads to what Saari (2003) calls the Neutral Reversal Requirement.
A5. Neutral Reversal: if P′ is obtained from P by adding two voters with reversed ballots, then x defeats
y in P if and only if x defeats y in P′.
Not only Split Cycle but all other margin based VCCRs (recall Example 2.11) satisfy Neutral Reversal.
However, Neutral Reversal is weaker than the assumption that a VCCR is margin based.
19Cf. Woeginger (2002), who notes that while Anonymity and Neutrality “are natural and fairly weak, the positive respon-
siveness axiom is usually criticized for being too strong” (p. 89).
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Example 4.4. We define the Positive/Negative VCCR (cf. Heckelman and Ragan Forthcoming) as follows.
In a profile P, a candidate x receives 1 point for every voter who ranks x first and −1 point for every voter
who ranks x last. The score of x in P is the sum of the points x receives from voters. Then x defeats y in
P if the score of x is greater than the score of y. This Positive/Negative VCCR satisfies Neutral Reversal,
as a pair of reversed ballots adds a net score of 0 to each candidate. Yet it is easy to construct profiles with
the same margin graphs that have different defeat relations.
Not all common VCCRs satisfy Neutral Reversal, as Examples 4.5-4.6 below show. To analyze violations
of Neutral Reversal, we distinguish its two directions:
• Upward Neutral Reversal: if P′ is obtained from P by adding two voters with reversed ballots, then if
x defeats y in P, x defeats y in P′.
• Downward Neutral Reversal: if P′ is obtained from P by adding two voters with reversed ballots, then
if x defeats y in P′, x defeats y in P.
Example 4.5. Consider the Plurality VCCR from Example 2.11. Let P be any profile for candidates a, b, c.
Adding to P a pair of voters with the reversed ballots abc and cba to obtain a profile P′ increases the plurality
scores of a and c by one but does not increase the plurality score of b. From here it is easy to see that the
Plurality VCCR violates both Upward and Downward Neutral Reversal.
Example 4.6. The Pareto VCCR f is defined as follows: for any profile P and x, y ∈ X(P), x defeats y in
P if and only if all voters in P rank x above y. Clearly adding two voters with reversed ballots to a profile
in which x is unanimously ranked above y results in a profile in which x is not unanimously ranked above y.
Thus, the Pareto VCCR violates Upward Neutral Reversal. However, it trivially satisfies Downward Neutral
Reversal, because if P′ has a pair of voters with reversed ballots, then no candidates defeats any other in P′.
The Pareto VCCR seems reasonable for certain special purposes, e.g., in a small club, unanimity may be
valued and often possible. However, in elections where disagreement is expected, the Pareto VCCR would
be of little help in narrowing down the range of possible winners, as so few candidates would defeat others.
Of course, we agree that it is a sufficient condition for x to defeat y that x is unanimously ranked above
y. A VCCR f is said to satisfy the Pareto axiom if for all profiles P and x, y ∈ X(P), if xPiy for all
i ∈ V (P), then x defeats y in P according to f . Split Cycle clearly satisfies the Pareto axiom. Moreover,
we can use Pareto and Upward Neutral Reversal to derive the converse of Special Majority Defeat (Lemma
4.2), thereby obtaining a characterization of majority rule for two-candidate elections that differs from May’s
(1952) famous characterization (cf. Aşan and Sanver 2002, Woeginger 2002, and Llamazares 2006, Cor. 12).
Proposition 4.7. For any VCCR f , the following are equivalent:
1. f coincides with majority rule on two-candidate profiles;
2. f satisfies the following axioms with respect to two-candidate profiles: Anonymity, Neutrality, Mono-
tonicity, Pareto, and Upward Neutral Reversal.
Proof. The implication from 1 to 2 is easy to check. From 2 to 1, we already proved in Lemma 4.2 that if f
satisfies Anonymity, Neutrality, and Monotonicity for two-candidate profiles, then in such a profile, x defeats
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y only if x is majority preferred to y. We now use Pareto and Upward Neutral Reversal to show that if x is
majority preferred to y, then x defeats y. For suppose P is a two-candidate profile in which x is majority
preferred to y. Consecutively remove pairs of voters (i, j) with xPiy and yPjx until we obtain a profile P0
in which all voters rank x over y. By Pareto, x defeats y in P0. Then by repeated application of Upward
Neutral Reversal, adding back the removed pairs of voters, x defeats y in P.
We prefer this characterization of majority rule to that of May (1952) for the reason given in Remark 4.3.
4.3 Coherent IIA and The Fallacy of IIA
Suppose x defeats y in a profile P, and a profile P′ is exactly like P with respect to how every voter ranks x
vs. y. Should it follow that x defeats y in P′? Arrow’s (1963) famous axiom of the Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives says ‘yes’ (see Section 6.1). But we say ‘no’ if P′ is more incoherent than P, in terms of cycles.
If P′ is sufficiently incoherent, we may need to suspend judgment on many defeat relations that we could
coherently accept in P. To overlook this point is to commit what we call The Fallacy of IIA.20
Although there is a perfectly reasonable notion of the advantage of x over y that only depends on how
voters rank x vs. y, whether that intrinsic advantage is sufficient for x to defeat y may depend on a standard
that takes into account the whole election, e.g., that takes into account whether the electorate is incoherent
with respect to a set of candidates including x, y (see Holliday and Kelley 2020 for a formalization of the
advantage-standard idea). That standards may be context dependent should be no surprise: just as whether
a person counts as “tall” depends on who else is being assessed for tallness in the context of our judgment,
whether one candidate’s performance against another counts as “a defeat” depends on which other pairwise
candidate performances are also being assessed as potential defeats in the context of our judgment.21
Example 4.8. In the profiles P and P′ below, we have P|{a,b} = P
′
|{a,b}. In the context of the perfectly
coherent profile P, the margin of n for a over b should be sufficient for a to defeat b. But in the context of
the incoherent profile P′, it is not sufficient: no one can be judged to defeat anyone else (this follows from
Anonymity, Neutrality, and Availability). Thus, this is a counterexample to IIA.
n n n
a b c
b a a
c c b a c
b
n n
n
n n n
a b c
b c a
c a b a c
b
n n
n
However, it is not as if the standard for defeat in every case of a majority cycle is unattainable. In the profile
Q below, we believe that the advantage of a over b is sufficient for a to defeat b:
20We take this criticism of IIA to differ from some other criticisms of IIA, such as those in Mackie 2003, Ch. 6.
21For a related proposal in the setting of judgment aggregation to set supermajority thresholds in a local, context sensitive
way, see Cariani 2016.
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4 2 3
a b c
b c a
c a b a c
b
3
1
5
According to Split Cycle, the standard for a to defeat b in a profile, which the margin of a over b must surpass,
is the maximum of the splitting numbers of the cycles containing a and b. Since the splitting number of the
cycle in the profile Q is 1, the margin of a over b surpasses the standard, so a defeats b.
Remark 4.9. In an illuminating result, Patty and Penn (2014) prove that Arrow’s IIA is equivalent to the
condition of unilateral flip independence, which states that if two profiles are alike except that one voter
flips one pair of adjacent candidates on her ballot, then the defeat relations for the two profiles can differ
at most on the flipped candidates. They write that this theorem “demonstrates a fundamental basis of the
normative appeal of IIA” (p. 52) (cf. Patty and Penn 2019, p. 155).22 However, observe that for the profiles
P and P′ in Example 4.8, if n = 1, then a single voter (the middle voter) flipping adjacent candidates on
her ballot (ac to ca) takes us from the coherent profile P, in which there is no difficulty in judging that a
defeats b, to the incoherent profile P′, in which no one can be judged to defeat anyone else. Hence unilateral
flip independence makes the same mistake as IIA in ignoring how context can affect the standard for defeat.
Remark 4.10. Maskin (2020) proposes a weakening of IIA called Modified IIA, which states that if profiles
P and P′ are alike in how every voter ranks x vs. y, and for each voter i and candidate z, i ranks z in
between x and y in P if and only if i ranks z in between x and y in P′, then x defeats y in P if and only if
x defeats y in P′. Saari (1994; 1995; 1998) proposed a stronger axiom, though still weaker than IIA, called
Intensity IIA: if profiles P and P′ are alike in how every voter ranks x vs. y, and for each voter i, the number
of candidates that i ranks in between x and y in P is the same as the number of candidates that i ranks in
between x and y in P′, then x defeats y in P if and only if x defeats y in P′. Modified IIA and Intensity IIA
are problematic for the same reason that IIA is, only we now need four candidates to see why. In the profiles
P and P′ below, we have P|{a,b} = P
′
|{a,b}, and for each voter i and candidate z, i ranks z in between a and
b in P if and only if i ranks z in between a and b in P′. In the context of the perfectly coherent profile P, the
margin of 2n for a over b should be sufficient for a to defeat b. But in the context of the incoherent profile
P′, it is not sufficient: no one can be judged to defeat anyone else (this follows from Anonymity, Neutrality,
and Availability). Thus, this is a counterexample to Modified IIA and Intensity IIA.
n n n n
a b a a
b c b b
c d c d
d a d c
a b
cd
2n
4n
2n
2n
22Patty and Penn (2019) do not think that IIA is compelling for voting procedures in elections (see their Section 3.1), but
they do find it compelling in contexts of multicriterial decision making.
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n n n n
a b c d
b c d a
c d a b
d a b c
a b
cd
2n
2n
2n
2n
Maskin (2020) suggests the benefit of Modified IIA is that it rules out vote-splitting, which he illustrates using
spoiler effects in Plurality voting as in Examples 1.1 and 1.3. However, Modified IIA is neither necessary nor
sufficient for a voting procedure to have good anti-spoiler properties. Split Cycle does not satisfy Modified
IIA—it correctly says that a defeats b in P but not P′ above—yet Split Cycle satisfies strong anti-spoiler
properties: not only Independence of Clones (Tideman 1987), as shown in Holliday and Pacuit 2020a, but
also a condition of Immunity to Spoilers, as shown below. On the other hand, Borda satisfies Modified IIA
yet satisfies neither Independence of Clones nor Immunity to Spoilers, as shown in Example 4.15 below.
Avoiding The Fallacy of IIA does not mean abandoning the idea behind IIA entirely.23 We need only
depart from its local evaluation of x vs. y when increasing incoherence demands that we be more conservative
in locking in relations of defeat. If there is no increase in incoherence from profile P to P′, then if the intrinsic
advantage of x over y is sufficient for x to defeat y in P, we think it should still be sufficient for x to defeat
y in P′. Moreover, a clearly sufficient condition for there to be no increase in incoherence from P to P′ is
the following: the margin graph of P′ is obtained from that of P by deleting zero or more candidates other
than x and y and deleting or reducing the margins on zero or more edges not connecting x and y.24 For such
deletions or reductions can only reduce incoherence. For example, in the profile Q in Example 4.8, deleting
candidate c or deleting or reducing the margins on the c → a or b → c edges only reduces incoherence, so
a’s defeat of b should be preserved. Thus, we arrive at our proposed axiom of Coherent IIA.
A6. Coherent IIA: if x defeats y in P, and P′ is a profile such that P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} and the margin graph
of P′ is obtained from that of P by deleting zero or more candidates other than x and y and deleting
or reducing the margins on zero or more edges not connecting x and y, then x still defeats y in P′.
In Section 6.1.2, we show that Coherent IIA implies Weak IIA (Baigent 1987): if two profiles are exactly
alike with respect to how every voter ranks x vs. y, it cannot be that in one profile x defeats y while in the
other profile y defeats x. At most, a defeat that holds in one can be withdrawn in the other.
Proposition 4.11. Split Cycle satisfies Coherent IIA.
Proof. Suppose x defeats y in P, so by Lemma 3.5, MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for any majority cycle
ρ in P containing x and y. Since P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}, MarginP(x, y) = MarginP′(x, y). Since M(P
′) is
obtained from M(P) by deleting zero or more candidates other than x and y and zero or more edges not
connecting x and y, every majority cycle ρ in P′ containing x and y is already a majority cycle in P
containing x and y, and as no margins have increased from P to P′, Split#P(ρ) ≥ Split#P′(ρ). It follows
that MarginP′(x, y) > Split#P′(ρ) for any majority cycle ρ in P
′ containing x and y. Thus, x defeats y
in P′ by Lemma 3.5.
23For an intellectual history of the ideas behind IIA, going back to Condorcet and Daunou, see McLean 1995.
24By allowing for the deletion of candidates, Coherent IIA is a weakening of a variable-candidate version of IIA that we call
VIIA, defined in Section 6.2.
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Unlike our proposed axioms in previous sections, Coherent IIA significantly cuts down the space of
allowable VCCRs, ruling out all the VCCRs in Examples 2.11 and 2.16 except for Simple Majority. For
example, it rules out the Borda VCCR as follows.
Example 4.12. To see that Borda fails Coherent IIA, consider the following profiles P and P′:
1 1 2
x y y
a x x
b a c
c b b
y c a
x
a
y
cb
2
4 4
4 2
2 2
1 1 2
a y y
b a x
c b c
x c b
y x a
x
a
y
cb
2
2
2 2
According to the Borda VCCR, x defeats y in P: despite the fact that only one person prefers x to y, whereas
three prefer y to x, the proponent of Borda ascribes some significance to the fact that the first voter places
a, b, c between x and y (perhaps strategically, of course). Now although P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} and the margin
graph of P′ is obtained from that of P by deleting some edges not connecting x and y, Borda changes the
verdict for P′ and says that y defeats x in P′. Thus, Borda violates Coherent IIA. The mistake, in our view,
was to judge that x defeats y in P in the first place. According to Split Cycle, by contrast, y defeats x in P
because y is majority preferred to x and there are no majority cycles in P.
Example 4.12 shows that Borda fails to satisfy the principle of Majority Defeat from Section 1: if x
defeats y in P, then x is majority preferred to y in P.
Lemma 4.13. Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity (for two-candidate profiles), and Coherent IIA together
imply Majority Defeat.
Proof. Suppose x defeats y in P. Then by Coherent IIA, x defeats y in P|{x,y}. Given Anonymity, Neutrality,
and Monotonicity, it follows by Lemma 4.2 that x is majority preferred to y in P|{x,y} and hence in P.
Remark 4.14. Whenever an election has a Condorcet winner, Majority Defeat implies that the Condorcet
winner is undefeated, but it does not imply that the Condorcet winner is the only undefeated candidate.
Thus, Majority Defeat does not by itself imply Condorcet consistency.
Finally, we will show that Coherent IIA (together with Anonymity, Neutrality, and Monotonicity) rules
out the kind of spoiler effects shown in Examples 1.1-1.3. For this, we must consider an election with and
without a potential spoiler. Given a profile P and b ∈ X(P), let P−b be the profile obtained from P by
deleting b from all ballots.25 In Holliday and Pacuit 2020a, we define the following axiom:
25I.e., P−b = P|X(P)\{b}, using the notation of Definition 2.2.
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• Immunity to Spoilers: if a is undefeated in P−b, and a is majority preferred to b in P, and b is defeated
in P, then a is still undefeated in P.
Examples 1.1 and 1.3 show how Plurality voting can violate Immunity to Spoilers. In the first example,
assume Gore would win in the two-candidate profile P−Nader and that Gore is majority preferred to Nader
in the full election P. Then since Nader is defeated in P, Immunity to Spoilers requires that Nader not spoil
the election for Gore, i.e., that Gore is still a winner in P. The analysis of Example 1.3 is similar, making
some assumptions about voters’ rankings of Cruz, Kasich, and Rubio. Example 1.2 shows how Ranked
Choice voting can violate Immunity to Spoilers. Montroll wins in the two-candidate profile P−Wright, and
Montroll is majority preferred to Wright in the full election P. Then since Wright is defeated in P, Immunity
to Spoilers requires that Wright not spoil the election for Montroll, i.e., that Montroll is still a winner in P.
To see how Borda violates Immunity to Spoilers, consider the following.
Example 4.15. Let P−b (left) and P (right) be the following profiles:
2 3
c a
a c
a c1
2 3
c a
b c
a b
a c b1 5
1
According to Borda, a defeats c in P−b. Note that a is majority preferred to b in P, and b is defeated in P
by both a and c according to Borda. But the addition of the loser b spoils the election for a, as c defeats
a in P according to Borda. This violates Immunity to Spoilers. It is also violates Independence of Clones
(Tideman 1987), as b is a clone of c (no candidates appear in between b and c on any voter’s ballot). Finally,
c defeating a in P but not in P−b is another violation of Coherent IIA (see the proof of Proposition 4.16).
In fact, Coherent IIA (together with the other mentioned axioms) implies an even strong anti-spoiler
axiom from Holliday and Pacuit 2020a:
• Strong Stability for Winners: if a in undefeated in P−b, and b is not majority preferred to a in P, then
a is still undefeated in P.
Proposition 4.16. Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity (for two-candidate profiles), and Coherent IIA
together imply Strong Stability for Winners.
Proof. Suppose a is undefeated in P−b according to f and that b is not majority preferred to a in P. Suppose
for contradiction that a is defeated in P according to f . Since b is not majority preferred to a in P, it follows
by Lemma 4.13 that b does not defeat a in P according to f . Hence there is some c ∈ X(P) \ {b} that
defeats a in P according to f . Then since P|{a,c} = (P−b)|{a,c} and the margin graph of P−b is obtained
from that of P by deleting a candidate other than a and c, it follows by Coherent IIA that c defeats a in
P−b according to f , contradicting our initial assumption.
Thus, contrary to Maskin 2020, it is Coherent IIA rather than Modified IIA that mitigates spoiler effects.
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5 Characterization
In this section, we prove our main result using the axioms proposed in Section 4. Given VCCRs f and g, we
say that g is at least as resolute as f if for every profile P and x, y ∈ X(P), if x defeats y in P according
to f , then x defeats y in P according to g. It follows that the set of winners according to g (i.e., the set of
undefeated candidates according to g) is always a subset of the set of winners according to f (i.e., the set of
undefeated candidates according to f). Roughly speaking, more resolute means smaller sets of winners.
Given a class C of VCCRs and g ∈ C, we say that g is the most resolute VCCR in C if g is at least
as resolute as every VCCR in C, or equivalently, if for every profile P, x, y ∈ X(P), and f ∈ C, if x
defeats y in P according to f , then x defeats y in P according to g. A number of voting procedures can be
characterized as “the most resolute procedure satisfying such and such properties” (see, e.g., Brandt et al.
2013; Brandt and Seedig 2014). We now give such a characterization of Split Cycle.
Theorem 5.1. Split Cycle is the most resolute of all VCCRs satisfying the six axioms for defeat:
A1. Anonymity and Neutrality: if x defeats y in P, and P′ is obtained from P by swapping the ballots
assigned to two voters, then x still defeats y in P′ (Anonymity); and if x defeats y in P, and P′ is
obtained from P by swapping x and y on each voter’s ballot, then y defeats x in P′ (Neutrality).
A2. Availability: for every P, there is some undefeated candidate in P.
A3. (Upward) Homogeneity: for every P, if x defeats y in P, then x defeats y in 2P.
A4. Monotonicity (for two-candidate profiles): if x defeats y in P (a two-candidate profile), and P′ is
obtained from P by some voter i moving x above the candidate that i ranked immediately above x in
P, then x defeats y in P′.
A5. Neutral Reversal: if P′ is obtained from P by adding two voters with reversed ballots, then x defeats
y in P if and only if x defeats y in P′.
A6. Coherent IIA: if x defeats y in P, and P′ is a profile such that P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} and the margin graph
of P′ is obtained from that of P by deleting zero or more candidates other than x and y and deleting
or reducing the margins on zero or more edges not connecting x and y, then x still defeats y in P′.
Proof. We have already observed that Split Cycle satisfies the axioms. Next, we show that for any VCCR
f satisfying the axioms for defeat and any profile P, if x defeats y in P according to f , then x defeats y
in P according to Split Cycle. Toward a contradiction, suppose x defeats y in P according to f but not
according to Split Cycle. Since P may have an odd number of voters, consider 2P. It follows by (Upward)
Homogeneity that x defeats y in 2P according to f . But according to Split Cycle, x does not defeat y
in 2P (whose qualitative margin graph is the same as P). Since x defeats y according to f , by Majority
Defeat (Lemma 4.13), we have Margin2P(x, y) > 0. Moreover, since 2P has an even number of voters,
Margin2P(x, y) is even. Now since x does not defeat y in 2P according to Split Cycle, by Lemma 3.6
there is a majority cycle x → y → z1 → · · · → zn → x in 2P such that Margin2P(x, y) is less than or
equal to every margin along the cycle. Let Q be obtained from 2P by adding zero or more reversal pairs
of voters so that |V (Q)| ≥ (n + 2)Margin2P(x, y). Then by (Upward) Neutral Reversal, x defeats y in Q
according to f . Let M′ be the weighted directed graph obtained from M(2P) by deleting all candidates
20
except x, y, z1, . . . , zn and all edges except the edges in the cycle and reducing the weights on all remaining
edges so they are equal to Margin2P(x, y). Let k = Margin2P(x, y)/2. We now construct a profile P
′ whose
margin graph is M′.26 For each edge a → b in x → y → z1 → · · · → zn → x, where c1, . . . , cn are the
elements from {x, y, z1, . . . , zn} \ {a, b} such that b→ c1 → · · · → cn → a, we add voters to P
′ as follows:
• if a = x (and hence b = y), then for k voters from V (Q) who rank x above y in Q, add them to
P′ with the ballot a, b, c1, . . . , cn (which in this case is x,y, z1, . . . , zn), and for k other voters from
V (Q) who rank x above y in Q, add them to P′ with the ballot cn, . . . , c1,a, b (which in this case is
z1, . . . , zn,x,y). See the first and second columns in the profile in Figure 1.
• if a 6= x and y occurs before x in the sequence b, c1, . . . , cn, a, then for k voters from V (Q) who rank y
above x in Q, add them to P′ with the ballot a, b, c1, . . . , cn, and for k voters from V (Q) who rank x
above y in Q, add them to P′ with the ballot cn, . . . , c1,a, b. See, e.g., the third and fourth columns
in the profile in Figure 1.
• if a 6= x and x occurs before y in the sequence b, c1, . . . , cn, a, then for k voters from V (Q) who rank x
above y in Q, add them to P′ with the ballot a, b, c1, . . . , cn, and for k voters from V (Q) who rank y
above x in Q, add them to P′ with the ballot cn, . . . , c1,a, b. See, e.g., the fifth and sixth columns in
the profile in Figure 1.
This construction uses 2k+(n+1)k voters from V (Q) who rank x over y and (n+1)k voters from V (Q) who
rank y over x, for a total of (n + 2)Margin2P(x, y) voters from V (Q). Then P
′ has the form in Figure 1.
Observe that M(P′) =M′ (e.g., MarginP′(x, y) = 2k = Margin2P(x, y), MarginP′(x, z1) = 0, etc.).
k k k k k k · · · k k
x zn y x z1 y · · · zn zn−1
y
... z1 zn z2 x · · · x
...
z1
... z2
...
... zn · · · y z1
... z1
... z2 zn
... · · · z1 y
... x zn y x z1 · · ·
... zn
zn y x z1 y z2 · · · zn−1 x
Figure 1: the profile P′.
Now we claim that x does not defeat y in P′ according to f . Toward a contradiction, suppose x does
defeat y in P′ according to f . Let σ(P′) be the profile obtained from P′ by the permutation σ that maps
each a ∈ {x, y, z1, . . . , zn} to the unique b ∈ {x, y, z1, . . . , zn} such that a→ b in P
′, as shown in Figure 2.
By Neutrality,27 since x defeats y in P′, it follows that y defeats z1 in σ(P
′). But P′ can obviously be
obtained from σ(P′) by a permutation of the voters (e.g., in Figures 1-2, the first column in P′ is the same
as the second to last column in σ(P′)). Thus, by Anonymity, since y defeats z1 in σ(P
′), it follows that y
defeats z1 in P
′. By similar reasoning using σ(σ(P′)), we have that z1 defeats z2 in P
′, etc., until we conclude
26This standard kind of construction is used in the proof of McGarvey’s theorem (McGarvey 1953).
27Here we use the permutation version of Neutrality in Footnote 16.
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k k k k k k · · · k k
y x z1 y z2 z1 · · · x zn
z1 zn z2 x z3 y · · · y
...
z2
...
... zn
... x · · · z1
...
... z2 zn
... zn
... · · ·
... z1
zn y x z1 y z2 · · ·
... x
x z1 y z2 z1 z3 · · · zn y
Figure 2: the profile σ(P′).
that xDyDz1D . . .DznDx where D is the defeat relation in P
′. This contradicts Availability. Hence x does
not defeat y in P′ according to f .
Since V (P′) ⊆ V (Q) and MarginQ(x, y) = MarginP′(x, y), it follows that half of the voters in
V (Q) \ V (P′) (which may be empty) rank x above y and half of the voters in V (Q) \ V (P′) rank y above
x. Let P′′ be obtained from P′ as follows: for each voter in V (Q) \ V (P′) who ranks x above y, add them
to P′′ with the ballot x, y, z1, . . . , zn, and for each voter V (Q) \ V (P
′) who ranks y above x, add them to
P′′ with the ballot zn, . . . , z1, y, x. Thus, P
′′ is obtained from P′ by adding zero or more reversal pairs of
voters, so by (Downward) Neutral Reversal, since x does not defeat y in P′ according to f , it follows that x
does not defeat y in P′′ according to f . Finally, we have:
• V (Q) = V (P′′) and Q|{x,y} = P
′′
|{x,y};
• M(P′′) is obtained from M(Q) by deleting zero or more candidates other than x and y and deleting
or reducing the margins on zero or more edges other than the x→ y edge.
Thus, by Coherent IIA, since x defeats y in Q according to f , we have that x defeats y in P′′ according to
f , contradicting what we derived above.
Of course Split Cycle is not the only VCCR that satisfies the six axioms for defeat. For example, the
null VCCR according to which no one ever defeats anyone else satisfies all six axioms—although it can easily
be ruled out by other axioms that Split Cycle satisfies, such as the Pareto axiom. Another example is the
VCCR according to which x defeats y ifMarginP(x, y) is greater than the splitting number of every majority
cycle in P, not only those majority cycles containing x and y. Since these VCCRs are not as resolute as
Split Cycle,28 they do not satisfy the seventh “axiom” that the VCCR should be the most resolute VCCR
among those satisfying the first six axioms. A natural next step would be to obtain another axiomatic
characterization of Split Cycle as the only VCCR satisfying some axioms without reference to resoluteness.
Theorem 5.1 shows that using a VCCR other than Split Cycle requires either violating one of the six
axioms for defeat or sacrificing resoluteness. For these and other reasons (see Holliday and Pacuit 2020a),
we settle on Split Cycle as our preferred VCCR and hence as our preferred answer to the question of when
one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election using ranked ballots.
28E.g., in the profile P in Example 3.2, neither of the mentioned VCCRs judges that a defeats d.
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6 Escaping impossibility
In this section, we address the question: how does Split Cycle escape Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem and
related impossibility results? In Section 6.1, we recall the standard formulation of Arrow’s theorem and
related results, and we explain how Split Cycle escapes these results. In Section 6.2, we reformulate these
results in the variable candidate setting in which we characterized Split Cycle. Finally, in Section 6.3, we
consider some simple impossibility results based not on IIA but instead on a choice-consistency principle
sometimes conflated with IIA, allegedly even by Arrow himself (see Appendix B).
6.1 Impossibility theorems in the fixed candidate setting
6.1.1 Arrow’s Theorem
Arrow (1963) worked in a fixed voter and fixed candidate setting (see Campbell and Kelly 2002, Penn 2015
for modern presentations). Fix a set V of voters and a set X of candidates. A (V,X)-profile is a profile P as
in Definition 2.1 in which V (P) = V and X(P) = X . A (V,X)-collective choice rule (or (V,X)-CCR) is a
function on the set of (V,X)-profiles such that for any (V,X)-profileP, f(P) is an asymmetric binary relation
on X .29 If f is a VCCR as in Section 2, then for any V ⊆ V and X ⊆ X , the restriction f|V,X of f to the set
of (V,X)-profiles is a (V,X)-CCR. In particular, for any such (V,X), the Split Cycle VCCR restricts to the
Split Cycle (V,X)-CCR. Our question is: how does the Split Cycle (V,X)-CCR escape Arrow’s Theorem?
Let f be a (V,X)-CCR. To state Arrow’s Theorem, we recall the following key notions:
• f is a (V,X)-social welfare function (or (V,X)-SWF) if for any (V,X)-profile P, f(P) is a strict weak
order (recall Section 2);
• f satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if for any (V,X)-profilesP andP′ and x, y ∈ X ,
if P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}, then x defeats y in P according to f if and only if x defeats y in P
′ according to f ;
• f satisfies Pareto if for any (V,X)-profile P and x, y ∈ X , if xPiy for all i ∈ V , then x defeats y in P
according to f ;
• an i ∈ V is a dictator for f if for all (V,X)-profiles P and x, y ∈ X , if xPiy, then x defeats y in P
according to f .
Then Arrow’s famous Impossibility Theorem can be stated as follows.30
Theorem 6.1 (Arrow 1963). Assume V is finite and |X | ≥ 3. Any (V,X)-SWF satisfying IIA and Pareto
has a dictator.
Remark 6.2. Since our profiles are profiles of linear ballots, the conclusion of Arrow’s theorem can be
strengthened to say that f has a strong dictator, i.e., an i ∈ V such that for all (V,X)-profiles P and
x, y ∈ X , we have that x defeats y in P according to f if and only if xPiy, i.e., f(P) = Pi.
29Note that we have built the condition of Universal Domain with respect to (V,X) into the definition of a (V,X)-CCR.
30Arrow considered profiles where each voter’s strict preference relation is a strict weak order, whereas we have assumed strict
linear orders. However, it is well known that Arrow’s Theorem can be proved for strict linear order profiles (see, e.g., Fishburn
1973, p. 208). In fact, Arrow’s Theorem for strict linear order profiles is a corollary of the statement of Arrow’s Theorem for
strict weak orders, by applying Lemma 3.4 of Holliday and Pacuit 2020b.
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The Split Cycle (V,X)-CCR avoids Arrow’s theorem due to the following facts:
1. We weaken IIA to Coherent IIA.31
2. We weaken Arrow’s assumption that the defeat relation is a strict weak order to it being acyclic.
Neither of these moves by itself is sufficient to escape Arrow-style impossibility theorems, as we show below.
6.1.2 Baigent’s Theorem
To see that weakening IIA to Coherent IIA is not sufficient, we first observe that Coherent IIA implies a
weakening of IIA known as Weak IIA, which states that if P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} and x defeats y in P
′ according
to f , then y does not defeat x in P according to f .
Lemma 6.3. If f is a VCCR satisfying Coherent IIA, then for any V ⊆ V and X ⊆ X , f|V,X satisfies Weak
IIA.
Proof. Suppose that P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} and x defeats y in P. Then by Coherent IIA, x defeats y in P|{x,y},
so y does not defeat x in P|{x,y}. Now if y defeats x in P
′, then by Coherent IIA, y defeats x in P′|{x,y} and
hence in P|{x,y}, since P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}, which is a contradiction. Therefore, y does not defeat x in P
′.
Under Weak IIA, Baigent (1987) proved an Arrow-style impossibility theorem asserting the existence of a
vetoer instead of a dictator.32 Given a (V,X)-CCR f , a voter i ∈ V is a vetoer for f if for all (V,X)-profiles
P and x, y ∈ X(P), if xPiy, then y does not defeat x in P according to f .
Theorem 6.4 (Baigent 1987). Assume V is finite and |X | ≥ 4. Any (V,X)-SWF satisfying Weak IIA and
Pareto has a vetoer.
The existence of a vetoer for an SWF is inconsistent with the SWF satisfying both Pareto and Anonymity.
Proposition 6.5. Suppose |V | ≥ 2 and |X | ≥ 3. Let f be a (V,X)-SWF satisfying Pareto. If f has a
vetoer, then f has a unique vetoer and hence violates Anonymity.
Proof. Suppose there are two vetoers j and k. Consider a profile P in which (i) xPiy for all i ∈ V , (ii) yPjz,
and (iii) zPkx. By (i) and Pareto, x defeats y in P according to f . By (ii), z does not defeat y, since j is a
vetoer. By (iii), x does not defeat z, since k is a vetoer. But since f is an SWF, f(P) is a strict weak order,
so if x defeats y, then either z defeats y or x defeats z. Thus, we have a contradiction.
As a corollary of Theorem 6.4 and Proposition 6.5, we have the following.
Corollary 6.6. Assume V is finite and |X | ≥ 4. There is no (V,X)-SWF satisfying Weak IIA, Pareto, and
Anonymity.
In light of Lemma 6.3, Theorem 6.4, and Corollary 6.6, only weakening IIA to Coherent IIA is not sufficient
to escape Arrow-style impossibility results.
31Strictly speaking, we have stated Coherent IIA in a variable candidate setting and IIA in a fixed candidate setting, so they
are not comparable in strength, but see Proposition 6.11 in Section 6.2.
32Cf. Campbell and Kelly (2000), who observe that at least four candidates are required for Baigent’s result.
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6.1.3 Blau-Deb Theorem
Weakening Arrow’s assumption that the defeat relation is a strict weak order to it being acyclic is also not
sufficient by itself. Blau and Deb (1977) prove a vetoer theorem for acyclic CCRs under IIA together with
Neutrality and Monotonicity (recall Section 4.1). Let f be a (V,X)-CCR. A coalition C ⊆ V of voters has
veto power for f if for any (V,X)-profile P and x, y ∈ X , if xPiy for all i ∈ C, then y does not defeat x in
P according to f .
Theorem 6.7 (Blau and Deb 1977). Let f be an acyclic (V,X)-CCR satisfying IIA, Neutrality, and Mono-
tonicity.
1. For any partition of V into at least |X |-many coalitions, at least one of the coalitions has veto power.
2. If |X | ≥ |V |, then f has a vetoer.
Remark 6.8. Part 2 is an immediate consequence of part 1 by considering the finest partition.
Remark 6.9. Inspection of the proof of the Veto Theorem in Blau and Deb 1977 shows that the assumption
of acyclicity may be replaced by the weaker axiom of Availability (recall Section 4.1).
As an example of applying Theorem 6.7.1, if there are five candidates, then for any partition of the
electorate into five coalitions—say, five coalitions of equal size—one of the five coalitions has veto power
(and hence, assuming Anonymity, all coalitions of the same size would have veto power). Moreover, in
the variable candidate setting, we can use Theorem 6.7 to prove the existence of a single vetoer under a
variable candidate version of IIA (see Proposition 6.15 below), without the assumption that |X | ≥ |V |. Thus,
weakening Arrow’s strict weak order assumption to the assumption of acyclicity (or even Availability) is not
enough by itself to escape Arrow-style impossibility theorems, as we would like to retain such appealing
properties as Neutrality and Monotonicity.
It is the combination of weakening IIA to Coherent IIA and weakening Arrow’s strict weak order as-
sumption to acyclicity that allows Split Cycle to escape Arrow-style impossibility theorems.
6.2 Impossibility theorems in the variable candidate setting
Since we have analyzed Split Cycle as a VCCR in this paper, to properly make claims about how Split Cycle
relates to Arrow-style impossibility theorems, we should recast these results in the variable-election setting.
In this setting, there are two versions of Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA).
Definition 6.10. Let f be a VCCR.
1. f satisfies fixed-candidate Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (FIIA) if for any profiles P and P′
with X(P) = X(P′), if P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}, then x defeats y in P according to f if and only if x defeats
y in P′ according to f ;
2. f satisfies variable-candidate Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (VIIA) if for any profiles P and
P with x, y ∈ X(P)∩X(P′), if P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}, then x defeats y in P according to f if and only if x
defeats y in P′ according to f .
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We suggest in Appendix B that if asked to formulate his axioms for VCCRs, Arrow would formulate
IIA as VIIA. Our Coherent IIA is a weakening of VIIA, as Coherent IIA strengthens the assumption from
P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} to the assumption that not only P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y} but also that the margin graph of P
′ is
obtained from that of P in a certain way.
Proposition 6.11. Any VCCR satisfying VIIA also satisfies Coherent IIA.
We reject VIIA in favor of Coherent IIA for the reasons explained in Section 4.3.
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem can be stated in the variable-election setting using some additional no-
tions. First, given V ⊆ V , a V -profile is a profile P as in Definition 2.1 in which V (P) = V . Second, given
i ∈ V ⊆ V and X ⊆ X , we say that i is (V,X)-dictator (resp. V -dictator) for f if for any (V,X)-profile
(resp. V -profile) P and x, y ∈ X(P), xPiy implies that x defeats y in P according to f .
Theorem 6.12 (Arrow’s Theorem for VSWFs). Suppose f is a VSWF satisfying the Pareto principle.
1. If f satisfies FIIA, then for any finite sets V ⊆ V and X ⊆ X with |X | ≥ 3, there is a (V,X)-dictator
for f .
2. If f satisfies VIIA, then for any finite set V ⊆ V , there is a V -dictator for f .
Proof. For part 1, let f|V,X be the restriction of f to (V,X)-profiles. Then f|V,X is a (V,X)-SWF as in
Section 6 satisfying IIA and Pareto. Since V is finite and |X | ≥ 3, Arrow’s Theorem (Theorem 6.1) gives us
the desired (V,X)-dictator for f .
For part 2, consider any finite V ⊆ V . Pick some finite X0 ⊆ X such that |X0| ≥ 3. Then as in part 1,
Arrow’s Theorem applied to f|V,X0 gives us an iV,X0 ∈ V who is a (V,X0)-dictator for f . We claim that iV,X0
is a V -dictator for f . Let Q be a V -profile. We must show that for all x, y ∈ X(Q), xQiV,X0 y implies that
x defeats y in Q according to f . Suppose xQiV,X0 y. Let X = X0 ∪X(Q). Since |X | ≥ 3, Arrow’s Theorem
applied to f|V,X gives us an iV,X ∈ V who is a (V,X)-dictator for f . We claim that iV,X = iV,X0 . Suppose
not. There is a (V,X)-profile P⋆ such that for some a, b ∈ X0, voter iV,X0 ranks a above b in P
⋆ while iV,X
ranks b above a in P⋆. Then since iV,X is a (V,X)-dictator, b defeats a in P
⋆ according to f . Hence by
VIIA, b defeats a in P⋆|X0 according to f . But this contradicts the fact that iV,X0 is a (V,X0)-dictator, given
that X(P⋆|X0) = X0 and iV,X0 ranks a above b in P
⋆
|X0
. Hence iV,X = iV,X0 , so iV,X0 is a (V,X)-dictator for
f . Now let Q+ be any (V,X)-profile such that Q+|X = Q. Then xQiV,X0 y implies xQ
+
iV,X0
y, so x defeats y
in Q+ according to f because iV,X0 is a (V,X)-dictator. Hence by VIIA, x defeats y in Q according to f ,
which completes the proof, as diagrammed in Figure 3 with Y = X(Q).
(V,X0)-dictator (V, Y )-dictator
(V,X0 ∪ Y )-dictator
Figure 3: To show that any (V,X0)-dictator is also a (V, Y )-dictator, we first show that any (V,X0)-dictator
is also a (V,X0 ∪ Y )-dictator and then show that any (V,X0 ∪ Y )-dictator is also a (V, Y )-dictator.
26
Remark 6.13. As in Remark 6.2, since our profiles are profiles of linear ballots, the conclusions of parts 1
and 2 of Theorem 6.12 can be strengthened with ‘strong dictator’ in place of ‘dictator’.
Remark 6.14. There are VSWFs satisfying Pareto and VIIA for which there is no i ∈ V who is a V -dictator
with respect to all V ⊆ V with i ∈ V . For example, let V be the set of natural numbers, and for any profile P,
let f(P) = Pmax(V (P)), where max(V (P)) is the greatest number in the set V (P). Thus, in the variable-voter
setting Arrow’s axioms are consistent with different electorates having different dictators.
Just as Arrow’s Theorem can be adapted to the variable-election setting, so can Baigent’s Theorem
(Theorem 6.4), which we leave as an exercise to the reader (hint: use Proposition 6.5 to obtain the analogue
of Theorem 6.12.2). More interesting is the reformulation of the Blau-Deb Theorem (Theorem 6.7) in the
variable-election setting—in particular, the variable-candidate setting—as VIIA allow us to strengthen the
conclusion of the theorem to state the existence of a vetoer without the restriction that |X | ≥ |V |.
To state the variable-candidate version of the Blau-Deb Theorem, we need the following notions. Given
finite V ⊆ V , i ∈ V , finite X ⊆ X , and a, b ∈ X , we say that:
• i is a (V,X)-vetoer for f on (a, b) if for all (V,X)-profiles P, if aPib, then b does not defeat a in P
according to f ;
• i is a (V,X)-vetoer for f if for every a, b ∈ X , i is a (V,X)-vetoer for f on (a, b);
• i is a V -vetoer for f if for every finite X ⊆ X , i is a (V,X)-vetoer for f .
Theorem 6.15. If f is a VCCR satisfying VIIA, Availability, Neutrality, and Monotonicity, then for any
finite V ⊆ V , f has a V -vetoer.
Proof. Consider any finite V ⊆ V . Pick some finite X0 ⊆ X such that |X0| ≥ |V |. Then Theorem 6.7.2 (and
Remark 6.9) applied to f|V,X0 gives us an iV,X0 ∈ V who is a (V,X0)-vetoer for f . We claim that iV,X0 is
a V -vetoer for f . Let Q be a V -profile. We must show that for all x, y ∈ X(Q), xQiV,X0 y implies that y
does not defeat x in Q according to f . Suppose xQiV,X0 y. Let X = X0 ∪ X(Q). We claim that for any
a, b ∈ X0, voter iV,X0 is a (V,X)-vetoer on (a, b). Suppose P is a (V,X)-profile such that aPiV,X0 b. Then
iV,X0 ranks a above b in the restricted profile P|X0 , and iV,X0 is a (V,X0)-vetoer, so b does not defeat a in
P|X0 , which by VIIA implies that b does not defeat a in P. Thus, iV,X0 is a (V,X)-vetoer on (a, b), which
by Neutrality implies that iV,X0 is a (V,X)-vetoer.
33 Now let Q+ be any (V,X)-profile extending Q. Then
xQiV,X0 y implies xQ
+
iV,X0
y, so y does not defeat x in Q+ according to f because iV,X0 is a (V,X)-vetoer.
Hence by VIIA, y does not defeat x in Q according to f , which completes the proof.
Theorem 6.15 shows howmoving to the variable-candidate setting and interpreting IIA as VIIA can strengthen
impossibility theorems. But by weakening VIIA to Coherent IIA, impossibility results like Theorem 6.15
disappear. Split Cycle satisfies Coherent IIA, Availability, Neutrality, and Monotonicity but has no vetoer.
33For suppose iV,X0 is not a (V,X)-vetoer, so there are a
′, b′ ∈ X and a (V,X)-profile Q such that iV,X0 ranks a
′ above b′ in
Q but b′ defeats a′ in Q. Consider any permutation σ of X such that σ(a) = a′ and σ(b) = b′. Applying this permutation to
Q as in Footnote 16 yields a profile σQ in which iV,X0 ranks a above b. By the permutation version of Neutrality in Footnote
16, since b′ defeats a′ in Q, b defeats a in σQ. This contradicts the fact that iV,X0 is a (V,X)-vetoer on (a, b).
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6.3 Impossibility, independence, and choice consistency
Our rejection of VIIA in favor of Coherent IIA also leads us to reject another well-known principle that
is related to VIIA, at least under one interpretation. In particular, the term ‘Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives’ is sometimes used in the theory of rational choice for a condition that differs from Arrow’s but
also leads to impossibility theorems when applied in a certain way to voting. A choice function on a set X
of candidates is a function C such that for any nonempty subset Y of X , C(Y ) is a nonempty subset of Y .
Such a choice function satisfies Sen’s (1971) condition α if
for all nonempty Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X , we have Z ∩ C(Y ) ⊆ C(Z).
As a famous illustration of this condition in the context of individual choice, attributed to Sidney Mor-
genbesser, imagine that when offered a choice between apple pie and blueberry pie, you choose apple pie; but
when offered a choice between apple, blueberry, and cherry, you switch to blueberry. This violates α where
Z = {apple, blueberry}, Y = {apple, blueberry, cherry}, C(Y ) = {blueberry}, and C(Z) = {apple}. Sen’s α
is also known as ‘Chernoff’s axiom’ (Chernoff 1954) and sometimes ‘Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives’
(cf. Radner and Marschak 1954). But as Suzumura warns (1983, p. 66), “[C]are should be taken concerning
the occasional unfortunate confusions in the literature between condition I [IIA] and Chernoff’s axiom of
choice consistency, despite rather obvious contextual differences between them.” In Appendix B, we discuss
the common allegation that Arrow himself was guilty of this confusion, as it relates to VIIA.
How can a choice-consistency axiom such as Sen’s α be applied to voting to compare it with IIA? Given
an acyclic VCCR f and profile P, there are two ways to use f and P to define a choice function on X(P):34
1. the global choice function Gf (P, ·) induced by f,P: for any nonempty Y ⊆ X(P),
Gf (P, Y ) = {y ∈ Y | there is no z ∈ Y that defeats y in P according to f}.
2. the local choice function Lf (P, ·) induced by f,P: for any nonempty Y ⊆ X(P),
Lf (P, Y ) = {y ∈ Y | there is no z ∈ Y that defeats y in P|Y according to f}.
Example 6.16. The distinction between the global choice function and local choice function can be illus-
trated by the well-known distinction between global Borda count and local Borda count.35 Let f be the
VCCR according to which x defeats y in a profile P according to f just in case the Borda score of x in P
is greater than that of y. Then Gf (P, Y ), the elements of Y chosen according to global Borda count, are
the elements of Y whose Borda scores are maximal among elements of Y , where Borda scores are calculated
with respect to the full profile P. By contrast, Lf (P, Y ), the element of Y chosen according to local Borda
count, are the elements of Y whose Borda scores are maximal among elements of Y , where Borda scores are
calculated with respect to the restricted profile P|Y . For example, consider the following profiles P (left)
and P|Y (right) where Y = {x, y, a}:
34For Gf (P, Y ) to be a choice function, i.e., for ∅ 6= Y ⊆ X(P) to imply Gf (P, Y ) 6= ∅, f must be acyclic. But for Lf (P, ·)
to be a choice function, it suffices that f satisfies the weaker axiom of Availability.
35This terminology is due to Kelly (1988, p. 71, 74). Sen (1987, pp. 78-9) uses the terms ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’.
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1 1 2
x y y
a x x
b a c
c b b
y c a
1 1 2
x y y
a x x
y a a
Global Borda count yields Gf (P, Y ) = {x}, as x has the highest Borda score in P, while local Borda count
yields Lf (P, Y ) = {y}, as y has the highest Borda score in the restricted profile P|Y .
Before using the global and local choice functions to define two senses of Sen’s α for voting, we must note
that the distinction between global and local is lost under the assumption of VIIA.
Proposition 6.17. Let f be an acyclic VCCR. The following are equivalent:
1. f satisfies VIIA;
2. for any profile P and Y ⊆ X(P), Gf (P, Y ) = Lf (P, Y ).
Proof. Suppose f satisfies VIIA. Consider any profile P and Y ⊆ X(P). Then the following are equivalent
for any y, z ∈ Y :
• z defeats y in P according to f ;
• z defeats y in P|{y,z} according to f (by VIIA);
• z defeats y in (P|Y )|{y,z} according to f (since P|{y,z} = (P|Y )|{y,z});
• z defeats y in P|Y according to f (by VIIA).
Hence Gf (P, Y ) = Lf (P, Y ) by the definitions of Gf (P, ·) and Lf (P, ·).
Suppose condition 2 holds. Consider profiles P and P′ with x, y ∈ X(P) ∩X(P′) and P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}.
We must show that x defeats y in P according to f if and only if x defeats y in P′ according to f . This is
equivalent to the claim that Gf (P, {x, y}) = Gf (P
′, {x, y}). We claim that the following equations hold:
Gf (P, {x, y}) Gf (P
′, {x, y})
= =
Lf (P, {x, y}) = Lf (P
′, {x, y})
The vertical equations hold by condition 2, while the horizontal equation holds since P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}.
Hence Gf (P, {x, y}) = Gf (P
′, {x, y}).
Assuming we weaken VIIA, we can make the local-global distinction and hence distinguish two senses of
Sen’s α in the context of voting.
Definition 6.18. Let f be an acyclic VCCR.
1. f satisfies Global-α if Gf (P, ·) satisfies α for all profiles P;
2. f satisfies Local-α if Lf (P, ·) satisfies α for all profiles P.
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It is well known that Global-α imposes no constraint on an acyclic VCCR.
Proposition 6.19. If f is an acyclic VCCR, then f satisfies Global-α.
Proof. The claim that f satisfies Global-α is the claim that for any profile P and nonempty Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X(P),
we have Z ∩ Gf (P, Y ) ⊆ Gf (P, Z). Indeed, if y ∈ Z ∩ Gf (P, Y ), so by definition there is no z ∈ Y that
defeats y in P according to f , then since Z ⊆ Y , there is no z ∈ Z that defeats y in P according to f , which
by definition implies y ∈ Gf (P, Z).
Let us now consider Local-α as a constraint on VCCRs. First, we note that it is a weakening of VIIA.
Proposition 6.20.
1. If f is an acyclic VCCR satisfying VIIA, then f satisfies Local-α;
2. There are acyclic VCCRs satisfying Local-α but not FIIA and hence not VIIA.
Proof. For part 1, assuming that f satisfies VIIA, we show that for any profile P and nonempty Z ⊆ Y ⊆
X(P), we have Z ∩ Lf (P, Y ) ⊆ Lf (P, Z). Suppose y ∈ Z but y 6∈ Lf (P, Z), so there is an x ∈ Z that
defeats y in P|Z according to f . Then since (P|Z)|{x,y} = (P|Y )|{x,y}, it follows by VIIA that x defeats y in
P|Y according to f , which with x ∈ Z ⊆ Y implies y 6∈ Lf (P, Y ).
For part 2, let f be a VCCR such that x defeats y in P according to f if and only if (i) x is unanimously
preferred to y and (ii) there is a z ∈ X(P) \ {x, y} such that x → z but y 6→ z. Then f is acyclic in
virtue of (i). To see that f violates FIIA, consider two profiles P and P′ with X(P) = X(P′) = {x, y, z}
and V (P) = V (P′) such that all i ∈ V (P) have xPizPiy while all i ∈ V (P
′) have xP′iyP
′
iz. Then
P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}, and x defeats y in P but not in P
′, violating FIIA. To see that f satisfies Local-α, we
must show that for any profile P and nonempty Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X(P), we have Z∩Lf (P, Y ) ⊆ Lf (P, Z). Suppose
y ∈ Z but y 6∈ Lf (P, Z), so there is an x ∈ Z that defeats y in P|Z according to f . Hence x is unanimously
preferred to y in P|Z and there is a z ∈ Z such that x → z but y 6→ z. Then since Z ⊆ Y , we have that
x ∈ Y , that x is unanimously preferred to y in P|Y according to f , and that there is a z ∈ Y such that
x→ z but y 6→ z. Therefore, x defeats y in P|Y according to f , which with x ∈ Y implies y 6∈ Lf (P, Y ).
Although weaker than VIIA, Local-α is still a significant restriction on an acyclic VCCR, as it rules out
that the VCCR coincides with majority rule on two-candidates profiles.
Definition 6.21. A VCCR f satisfies Binary Majoritarianism if for any profile P with X(P) = {x, y}, x
defeats y in P according to f if and only if x is majority preferred to y in P.
We have the following easy impossibility result.
Proposition 6.22. There is no VCCR satisfying Local-α, Availability, and Binary Majoritarianism.
Proof. Consider a profile P with X(P) = {x, y, z} and a majority cycle x → y → z → x. By Availability,
there is some a ∈ {x, y, z} who is undefeated in P according to f . Since there is a majority cycle, there is
some b ∈ {x, y, z} such that b→ a. Hence by Binary Majoritarianism, b defeats a in P|{a,b} according to f .
Thus, we have a ∈ {a, b} ∩ Lf (P, {x, y, z}) but a 6∈ Lf (P|{a,b}, {a, b}), so f violates Local-α.
Combining Propositions 6.20.1 and 6.22, we have the analogue of Proposition 6.22 under VIIA.
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Corollary 6.23. There is no VCCR satisfying VIIA, Availability, and Binary Majoritarianism.
Finally, we can show how an analogue of Proposition 6.22 applies to voting methods (recall Definition
2.3). First, we adapt the definition of α to voting methods.
Definition 6.24. A voting method F satisfies α if for all nonempty Z ⊆ X(P), Z ∩ F (P) ⊆ F (P|Z).
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Given a VCCR f , its induced voting method f (recall Lemma 2.8) is related to its local choice function
in the following obvious way.
Lemma 6.25. Let f be a VCCR satisfying Availability. Then for any profile P,
f(P) = Lf (P, X(P)).
In light of Lemma 6.25 and the definitions of Local-α and α, the following is immediate.
Lemma 6.26. If f is a VCCR satisfying Availability and Local-α, then f satisfies α.
The proof of Proposition 6.22 is then easily adapted to yield the following impossibility result.
Proposition 6.27. There is no voting method satisfying α and Binary Majoritarianism.
As a voting method (resp. VCCR) Split Cycle satisfies Binary Majoritarianism but not α (resp. Local-α).
The mistake of insisting on α for voting is essentially the same as the mistake of insisting on IIA, which can
be seen by reformulating α as follows: for all nonempty Z ⊆ X(P), if x ∈ Z but x 6∈ F (P|Z), then x 6∈ F (P).
If F is defeat rationalizable, this means that if x is defeated in the smaller profile P|Z then x must also be
defeated in the larger profile P. But this should not follow if the larger profile P is more incoherent than
P|Z . If P is sufficiently incoherent, we may need to suspend judgment on many defeat relations that we
could coherently accept in P|Z .
Example 6.28. The same example used against IIA in Example 4.8 can be adapted to argue against Local-α
for VCCRs or α for voting methods. Consider the following profiles P and P′:
n n n
a b a
b a b
a bn
n n n
a b c
b c a
c a b a c
b
n n
n
In the context of the perfectly coherent profile P, the margin of n for a over b should be sufficient for a
to defeat b, so a should be the uniquely chosen winner. But in the context of the incoherent profile P′,
it is not sufficient: no one can be judged to defeat anyone else—this follows from Anonymity, Neutrality,
and Availability—so all three must be included in the choice set to which a further tie-breaking process is
applied. This is a counterexample to Local-α and α: b is undefeated in P′ but not in P′|{a,b} = P.
36Note that this is equivalent to the more direct translation of α to voting methods: for all nonempty Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X(P),
Z ∩ F (P|Y ) ⊆ F (P|Z ).
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Our conclusion concerning α applied to voting is in the spirit of Sen’s (1993) view that “Violations of
property α. . . can be related to various different types of reasons—easily understandable when the external
context is spelled out” (p. 501). Sen (pp. 500-502) focuses on rationalizing violations of α in individual choice
by reference to features of the context of choice. Here we have focused on rationalizing violations in voting
by reference to features of the context given by the profile—namely, an increase in incoherence from one
profile to another. To overlook this context would be to commit The Fallacy of IIA from Section 4.3.
7 Conclusion
The pessimistic conclusions about democracy that some have drawn from the Paradox of Voting and Arrow’s
Impossibility Theorem are not justified. Like most voting theorists, we are more optimistic. In particular, we
believe that many majority cycles can be resolved in a rational way, while respecting the principle of Majority
Defeat, as shown by Split Cycle. Of course there remain some cycles, such as a perfect cycle a→ b→ c→ a
in which each candidate is majority preferred to the next by exactly the same margin (and there are no other
candidates), which must lead to a tie between all candidates. But to think that democracy is devastated by
the possibility of such ties seems almost as unreasonable as thinking that democracy is devastated by the
possibility that in an election with only two candidates and an even number of voters, it could happen that
half of the voters vote for x over y while half vote for y over x. The fact that the set of winners cannot
always be a singleton—that some further tie-breaking mechanism must be in place—hardly warrants very
pessimistic conclusions, especially if non-singleton sets of winners are not likely, as we expect when there are
many voters compared to candidates (see Holliday and Pacuit 2020a).
Far from justifying pessimism about democracy, social choice theory leads the way to voting procedures
that can improve democratic decision making. We agree with Maskin and Sen (2017a; 2017b) that a major
improvement would come in replacing Plurality voting with a voting procedure using ranked ballots that
elects a Condorcet winner whenever there is one. In this paper, we have arrived at a unique voting procedure
of this kind, Split Cycle, via six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic
election—with the key axiom being the axiom of Coherent IIA that weakens Arrow’s IIA and explains why the
latter is too strong. As theorists, we sleep well at night knowing that we have a solid theoretical justification
for handling majority cycles in a certain way should they arise. As citizens and committee members, we
hope that in practice our elections will have Condorcet winners and that we will elect them.
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A Proofs for Section 3
Lemma 3.5. Let P be a profile and x, y ∈ X(P). Then x defeats y in P according to Split Cycle if and
only if MarginP(x, y) > 0 and
MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every majority cycle ρ in P containing x and y.
Proof. Suppose that in P, x wins by more than n over y for the smallest natural number n such that there is
no majority cycle, containing x and y, in which each candidate wins by more than n over the next candidate
in the cycle. Then MarginP(x, y) > n ≥ 0. Now consider some majority cycle ρ in P containing x and y.
By our choice of n, we have n ≥ Split#P(ρ), so MarginP(x, y) > n implies MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ).
Conversely, suppose MarginP(x, y) > 0 and MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every majority cycle ρ
in P containing x and y. If there exist such cycles, let n be the maximum of their splitting numbers, and
otherwise let n = 0. It follows that there is no majority cycle containing x and y in which each candidate
wins by more than n over the next candidate in the cycle; moreover, n is the smallest natural number for
which this holds. By our initial supposition, MarginP(x, y) > n, so we are done.
Lemma 3.6. Let P be a profile and x, y ∈ X(P). Then x defeats y in P according to Split Cycle if and
only if MarginP(x, y) > 0 and
MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every majority cycle ρ in P of the form x→ y → z1 → · · · → zn → x.
Proof. We use the formulation of Split Cycle in Lemma 3.5. If MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every
majority cycle ρ in P containing x and y, then in particularMarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ) for every majority
cycle ρ in P of the form x → y → z1 → · · · → zn → x. Conversely, suppose MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ)
for every majority cycle ρ in P of the form x → y → z1 → · · · → zn → x. Now consider a majority cycle ρ
in P containing x and y, whose splitting number is maximal among all such majority cycles. We must show
MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ). If y occurs immediately after x in ρ, then by “rotating the cycle” we obtain
a cycle ρ′ of the form x → y → z1 → · · · → zn → x with the same splitting number as ρ, in which case
MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ
′) by our initial supposition and hence MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ). Thus,
suppose y does not occur immediately after x in ρ. Then without loss of generality, we may assume ρ is of
the form y → z1 → · · · → zn → x→ w1 → · · · → wm → y. Let ρ
′ be the cycle x→ y → z1 → · · · → zn → x.
Then MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ
′) by our initial supposition, so the splitting number of ρ′ is the margin
associated with some successive candidates in the sequence y, z1, . . . zn, x. Since y, z1, . . . zn, x is a subsequence
of ρ, and the splitting number is defined as a minimum, it follows that Split#P(ρ
′) ≥ Split#P(ρ). Then
since MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ
′), we have MarginP(x, y) > Split#P(ρ), and since ρ was chosen to have
maximal splitting number among all majority cycles containing x and y, we are done.
B Arrow’s alleged confusion and VIIA
Arrow has been accused of confusing his own condition of IIA, an interprofile condition, with a choice-
consistency condition such as Sen’s α, defined in Section 6.3 (see, e.g., Hansson 1973, § 3, Ray 1973, p. 989,
and Suzumura 1983, p. 97, endnote 16, p. 250). To clarify this matter, which is relevant to our distinction
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between FIIA and VIIA, we first note that Arrow did not state IIA in what is now its most common form,
given in Definition 6.10.1. Instead, he stated it in the equivalent form (assuming acylicity) in Definition B.1.1.
Definition B.1. Let f be an acyclic VCCR.
1. f satisfies global choice FIIA if for any profiles P and P′ with V (P) = V (P′) and X(P) = X(P′) and
Y ⊆ X(P), if P|Y = P
′
|Y , then Gf (P, Y ) = Gf (P
′, Y ).
2. f satisfies local choice FIIA if for any profiles P and P′ with V (P) = V (P′) and X(P) = X(P′) and
Y ⊆ X(P), if P|Y = P
′
|Y , then Lf (P, Y ) = Lf (P
′, Y ).
Proposition B.2. Let f be an acyclic VCCR. Then f satisfies global choice FIIA if and only if f satisfies
FIIA.
Proof. Assume f satisfies global choice FIIA. To show that f satisfies FIIA, suppose P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}. Then
by global choice FIIA, Gf (P, {x, y}) = Gf (P
′, {x, y}). It follows by definition of Gf that x defeats y in P
according to f if and only if x defeats y in P′ according to f . Hence f satisfies FIIA.
Now assume f satisfies FIIA. To show that f satisfies global choice FIIA, suppose P|Y = P
′
|Y . Then for
any two x, y ∈ Y , P|{x,y} = P
′
|{x,y}. Hence by FIIA, x defeats y in P according to f if and only if x defeats
y in P′ according to f . It follows by definition of Gf that Gf (P, Y ) = Gf (P
′, Y ).
In contrast to global choice FIIA, which is a significant restriction on an acyclic VCCR, local choice FIIA
is no restriction.
Proposition B.3. If f is an acyclic VCCR, then f satisfies local choice FIIA.
Proof. By definition, we have
Lf (P, Y ) = {y ∈ Y | there is no z ∈ Y that defeats y in P|Y according to f}
Lf (P
′, Y ) = {y ∈ Y | there is no z ∈ Y that defeats y in P′|Y according to f},
which with P|Y = P
′
|Y implies Lf (P, Y ) = Lf (P
′, Y ).
Now consider one of Arrow’s (1963, p. 26) supposed arguments for IIA:
Suppose that an election is held, with a certain number of candidates in the field, each individual
filing his list of preferences, and then one of the candidates dies. Surely the social choice should
be made by taking each individual’s preference lists, blotting out completely the dead candidate’s
name, and considering only the orderings of the remaining names in going through the procedure
of determining the winner. That is, the choice to be made among the set S of surviving candidates
should be independent of the preferences of individuals for candidates not in S. To assume
otherwise would be to make the result of the election dependent on the obviously accidental
circumstance of whether a candidate died before or after the date of polling.
We agree with the literature cited above (Hansson 1973; Ray 1973; Suzumura 1983) that this is not an
argument that one’s VCCR should satisfy IIA. But neither is it an argument that one’s VCCR should satisfy
Local-α. In our view, the argument above is at most an argument for the thesis that if a candidate who
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appeared on the ballots in P dies after the ballots are collected, then one should choose among the surviving
candidates using the local choice function Lf (P, ·). As long as one chooses using the local choice function,
one follows all of Arrow’s recommendations above, regardless of whether f satisfies IIA or Local-α.
However, Arrow does not officially make the distinction between the global and local choice functions.
He only officially defines the global choice function induced by a CCR.37 But if in the example above,
Arrow wants the global choice function to act like the local choice function, this leads to VIIA according
to Proposition 6.17. Thus, one can understand the otherwise puzzling example of the dead candidate as
possibly related to Arrow’s implicit commitment to VIIA.
Arrow (1963, p. 27) gives another supposed argument for IIA, based on Borda count:
[S]uppose that there are three voters and four candidates, x, y, z, and w. Let the weights for the
first, second, third, and fourth choices be 4, 3, 2, and 1, respectively. Suppose that individuals
1 and 2 rank candidates in the order x, y, z, and w, while individual 3 ranks them in the order
z, w, x, and y. Under the given electoral system, x is chosen. Then, certainly, if y is deleted
from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to the remaining candidates should yield
the same result, especially since, in this case, y is inferior to x according to the tastes of every
individual; but, if y is in fact deleted, the indicated electoral system would yield a tie between x
and z.
Let P be the initial profile described by Arrow with X(P) = {x, y, z, w}. When Arrow says “if y is deleted
from the ranks of the candidates, the system applied to the resulting candidates should yield the same result”
which of the following did he mean?
1. since Gf (P, X(P)) = {x}, we should have Gf (P, {x, z, w}) = {x};
2. since Gf (P, X(P)) = {x}, we should have Gf (P|{x,z,w}, {x, z, w}) = {x};
3. since Lf (P, X(P)) = {x}, we should have Lf (P, {x, z, w}) = {x};
4. since Lf (P, X(P)) = {x}, we should have Lf (P|{x,z,w}, {x, z, w}) = {x}.
In fact, options 2, 3, and 4 are equivalent. Since Arrow only officially discusses the global choice function
induced by a CCR, he could not have officially meant 3 or 4. Moreover, since Arrow assumes that all of the
profiles in the domain of a given SWF have the same set of candidates, he could not have officially meant 2,
which requires that both P and P|{x,z,w} be in the domain of f . Thus, only option 1 officially makes sense
in his framework. Yet if f is Borda count, then Gf is global Borda count, which still chooses x as the unique
winner after y is removed from the input to Gf (P, ·), contradicting Arrow’s conclusion.
Arrow’s passage above certainly shows that the Borda VCCR f violates VIIA, because x defeats z in
P according to f but not in P|{x,z,w}.
38 Thus, one way of understanding Arrow’s intention in using the
example to motivate IIA is that he had in mind VIIA (cf. Bordes and Tideman 1991, p. 180).
37This follows from Arrow’s (1963) Definition 4 (p. 23), the first sentence of his Section III.3 (p. 26), and his Definition 3
(p. 15).
38It also shows that the Borda VCCR f violates what could be called Local-β (see Sen 1971): for any profile P and nonempty
Z ⊆ Y ⊆ X(P), if Lf (P, Z) ∩ Lf (P, Y ) 6= ∅, then Lf (P, Z) ⊆ Lf (P, Y ). It is also easy to see that the Borda VCCR violates
Local-α.
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